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 Despite the serious obstacles that stand in the way of discussing such questions as what 
constitutes a piece of music, the papers by Miss Carpenter and Professor Crocker deal sensitively with 
the issue and make useful and important observations. My comments are intended to assist in clarifying 
and furthering these discussions. Let me proceed by identifying and then applying two demands that this 
sort of question calls forth, the first conceptual and the second substantive. There is opportunity here to 
develop only some conceptual suggestions, and I shall merely be able to indicate the direction in which a 
substantive contribution might proceed. 
 When one faces the task of talking about music, as about any art, one encounters a double 
dilemma. Either you remain silent and safe, or you make use of words which, as a foreign medium that is 
used here primarily for a nonaesthetic end, must necessarily differ in kind from the art one is speaking of. 
If you do elect to communicate, you run headlong into a different problem, 
 for the language available for talking about art is remarkably unsatisfactory. Such language is almost 
always an unsuitable medium, composed generally of metaphor and evocation, and grounded usually on 
false analogies with linguistic functions (such as communication), with psychological explanations (such 
as catharsis, sublimation, and expression),i or with intellectualistic attributes (such as symbolism, 
meaning, and truth). Furthermore, if one wishes to avoid these pitfalls of conventional terminology, one is 
faced with the awesome task of devising new, more directly descriptive concepts. 
 The problem is especially difficult in the case of music. Unlike literature and the fine arts, music 
employs materials not commonly associated with language and the conceptual process, and it suffers 
most from being talked about. Often the most that is done is to apply to music the alien speech of 
another, more easily verbalized art. 
 Yet this difficulty, which music shares with the literary arts, actually helps us avoid a confusion to 
which the theory of literature is especially prone. Because it is directly and immediately perceptual, music 
raises the insistent demand to be taken on its own terms as experience. Moreover, music sharpens for us 
the differences between the ways in which art is experienced and the ways in which those experiences 
are understood and conceptualized. By noting and applying this basic distinction between the full 
perceptual experience of music and the concepts and linguistic medium through which that experience is 
codified and explained, we may thus hope to avoid the first dilemma, that which results from the need to 
talk about an art that is basically non-linguistic. 
 In applying this distinction to the notion of a "piece of music," then, we must make clear the 
differences that exist between the musical object as a perceptual whole and the musical object as a 
conceptual whole. For music comes first and foremost as experience. Indeed, in certain respects it 
epitomizes the perceptual qualities of all art, for in comparison with other artistic media the musical 
experience is less fraught with resemblances, relationships, and associations which distract and 
mislead us. This problem, unfortunately, occurs in the visual arts and is particularly grave in the literary 
ones. 
 In the directness of our experience, music appears as a phenomenal object. Here it is a 
perceptually congruent grouping of sounds, silences, and secondary visual, kinesthetic, and other 
active-passive sensory events. In this form, music is grasped in its intuitive experiential immediacy. 
When we proceed to describe and understand musical experience, we can employ broad perceptual 
categories such as sound and motion, or more specific ones such as pitch, timbre, dynamics, tonal 
succession, and juxtaposition. These categories are the musical concepts with which the composer 
works. However, music may also be described in conceptual categories like sonata-allegro form, 
harmonic rhythm, thematic relationships, style, and so forth. These are the concepts that the 
musicologist and theorist use in analyzing a musical work. It is certainly true that the perceptual and 
conceptual categories can and do overlap; yet the difference between them lies in the primary reference 
either to immediate auditory-experiential qualities or to the activities of analysis and organization. These 
categories resemble one another, however, in that they comprise referential symbols that are conceived 
apart from the actual perception of music and that depend on language rather than on sound. The 
composer occupies an ambiguous position a worker in musical materials he operates in the phenomenal 
medium of musical perception; yet when he pauses to reflect on or to explain what he is doing, he shifts 
to perceptual (and occasionally to conceptual) categories. Still, there is a striking consistency in the 
testimony of creative artists about their reliance on purely perceptual qualities for making creative 
decisions. They simply "like it that way" because "it sounds better."  
 There is, I believe, a good deal of evidence that favors the adoption of this distinction in the 
musical object between the experiential and the categorical. The history of music abounds with 
examples of ingenious technical bravado incorporated into a musical work which simply does not 
succeed in performance. And we all recognize how the aural integrity of a musical piece need not 
necessarily correspond with a unity that can be discovered by analyzing the work. If we wish, then, to 
be clear about what a musical piece is, we must decide whether we mean the object as heard or the 
object as analyzed. 
 Professor Crocker's paper offers several illustrations of the difficulties that result from the failure 
to notice and observe this fundamental distinction. His discussion is knowledgeable and illuminating 
through the range of illustrations he brings forward to test various proposals for locating the musical 
piece. Yet it shifts between the piece as an experienced unity, which he describes by referring to time 
span (five minutes plus or minus), and the piece as a structural entity (multi-movement works, sonata 
form, motet, aria). Similarly, he moves from the formal units through which we are exposed aurally to a 
composer's extended composition (the acts of operas, the movements of 
symphonies) to our knowledge of who he was and the intentions he had (as in our unwillingness to 
part from our conviction that a piece should have only one composer) for purposes of questioning 
whether the multi-movement trope and introit can be considered a single piece. The same ambiguity 
pursues Professor Crocker's discussion of Chopin's Preludes Op. 28 and Webern's Op. 5, for while 
we often hear the individual pieces which comprise each opus played straight through (perhaps 
changing the order in the case of the Chopin), neither of these works was intended as a 
multi-movement composition. The same perceptual-conceptual distinction is overlooked when we are 
led directly from considering the beginning, middle, and end of a piece as they sound, to the search for 
a canon of form, perhaps unknown, but nonetheless there. Our pursuit of the musical piece might be 
aided somewhat if we knew what it is we were seeking-sound or idea. I would opt for locating the 
primary sense of the notion of "musical object" or "piece" in the perceptual experience, and assigning 
the significance of formal, stylistic, intentional and other features to their effects on the musical 
experience. In
analogy. For our understanding of music has, I think, long been impeded by the tendency to 
assimilate it to the other more familiar and readily verbalized arts, just as our understanding of art in 
general has been sorely handicapped by our propensity to explain it in the light of concepts and 
objects of a wholly different and foreign sort. I have elsewhereii used the concept of "surrogate 
theories of art" to denote attempts of this sort, and the notion applies equally to the substitution of the 
conceptual object for the perceptual one, and the visual experience for the musical one. Once a path 
is charted around these pitfalls, we must devise concepts and categories that are taken from. musical 
experience. Only in the light of these can we hope to acquire a clearer understanding of the musical 
object. It would be presumptuous to do more than suggest a direction here, but perhaps that will be 
sufficient to provide a positive close to this discussion of two thoughtful and provocative papers. 
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